A convex analysis method is used to rederive the solutions to LQG optimal control problems. Then the methodology is applied to major minor LQG mean field game (MM LQG MFG) systems to retrieve the best response strategies for the major agent and each individual minor agent which collectively yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the entire system. mean field game (MM LQG MFG) systems to retrieve the best response strategies for the major agent and each individual minor agent addressed in [9] .
Introduction
In the literature, various approaches such as calculus of variations, (stochastic) maximum principle, dynamic programming, and change of functional have been used to address deterministic linear quadratic (LQ) and stochastic linear quadratic (LQG) optimal control problems [1] [2] [3] .
In a convex analysis approach to optimization for static systems, the Gâteaux derivative of the functional to be optimized is used to solve the problem (see e.g., [4] , [5] ). In [6] , the relationship between the Gâteaux derivative of the cost functional of a dynamic system and its Hamiltonian is established. A stochastic tracking problem in finance is studied in [7] using the convex analysis approach, while an algorithmic trading problem is investigated in [8] and the best response trading strategies are obtained for a large number of heterogeneous traders using the convex analysis approach.
In this work, a convex analysis method is used to rederive the solutions to LQG optimal control problems. Then the methodology is applied to major minor LQG
Single-Agent LQG Problems
In this section, the solutions to single-agent LQG problems are rederived using a convex analysis method.
Dynamics
Consider single-agent LQG systems with governing dynamics
where t ≥ 0, x t ∈ R n , u t ∈ R m , and w t ∈ R r denote, respectively, the state, the control action, and a standard Wiener process. Moreover, A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , and b(t) ∈ R n , σ(t) ∈ R n×r , are deterministic functions of time.
Control σ-Fields
We denote by F := (F t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by the agent's state (x t ) t∈[0,T ] . Then, we introduce the admissible control set U to be the set of feedback control laws with second moment lying in L 1 [0, T ], for any finite T , which are adapted to F .
Cost Functional
The cost functional to be minimized is given by
where ρ denotes the discount rate. Assumption 1. For cost the functional (7) to be convex, it is assumed that G ≥ 0, R > 0, and Q − NR −1 N T > 0.
Optimal Control Action
The system dynamics (6) together with the cost functional (7) constitute an LQ stochastic optimal control problem, which is solved for using the following theorem.
Theorem 2. (Gâteaux Derivative of Cost for LQG Systems) For system (6)- (7) , the Gâteaux derivative of the cost functional is given by
where M t is a martingale process given by
Proof. The Gâteaux derivative J ′ (u) of (7) is computed as follows.
The solution x u t to the state representation of the system (6) subject to the control action u t is given by
where x 0 ∈ R n and φ(t, s) = e A(t−s) , s ≤ t ≤ T, denote, respectively, the initial state and the state transition matrix for the system (6) . Let x u+ǫω t denote the solution to (6) subject to a perturbed control action u t + ǫω t in the direction of ω t given by
To find the relation between x u t and x u+ǫω t , (10) is substituted in (11) which yields
Then by differentiating both sides of (12), the evolution of x u+ǫω (t) in terms of x u (t) is given by
The cost induced by the perturbed control action u t + ǫω t and, subsequently, the perturbed state x u+ǫω t is given by
where the terminal cost, by utilizing the integration by parts technique, can be presented in integral form as
To write J(u + ǫω) in terms of J(u 0 ), u t and x u t , first (15), and then (12)-(13) are substituted in (14) 
Then the Gâteaux derivative of J ′ (u) in the direction of ω is obtained by first taking J(u) to the left hand side of (16), the dividing both sides of the equation by ǫ, and finally taking the limit as ǫ → 0, which yields
An application of Fubini's theorem to change the order of integration in (17) results in
By using integration by parts again, we have
whose substitution in (18) yields Using the smoothing property of conditional expectation [10] , the Gateaux derivative (20) may be rewritten as
Then the following martingale is defined
and is substituted in (21) to give
Theorem 3 (LQG Optimal Control Action). Given Assumption 1, the optimal control action for LQG systems given by (6)- (7) is specified by
Proof. As per Theorem 1 and Remark 1, the necessary condition for u * (t) to be the optimal control is given by
which, according to (8) , implies that
Moreover, since Assumption 1 holds, (25) is the sufficient condition of optimality as well.
Theorem 4 (LQG State Feedback Optimal Control). For LQG systems governed by (6)- (7), the optimal control action is given by the linear state feedback control
where Π(t) and s(t) are given bẏ
with terminal conditions Π(T ) = G and s(T ) = 0.
Proof. Let us define p(t) as
which is the adjoint process for the system (6)- (7) in the framework of stochastic maximum principle. Then the ansatz for p 0 t is adopted to be
and is substituted in (24) to give
To find Π(t) and s(t), both sides of (31) are first differentiated, and then (6) and (32) are substituted to yield
Next, both sides of (30) are differentiated to give
where according to the martingale representation theorem, the martingale M t may be written as
and hence
Then, equations (31), (32) and (36) are substituted in (34) to get
Finally, for (33) and (37) to be equal, the corresponding drifts and diffusions must be equal. Hence the following equations must hold
Remark 2 (Finite Horizon LQG Systems). Typically, the cost functional for finite horizon LQG systems is not discounted, i.e. ρ = 0, and hence the Riccati and offset equations (28)-(29) reduce to (7) is set to infinity, the terminal cost becomes zero. Hence, the infinite horizon cost functional is given by
The dynamics (6) remains the same in the infinite horizon LQG systems.
Given that Assumptions 7-8 hold, for infinite horizon LQG systems governed by (6) and (42), the optimal control action is given by (27), where the steady state Riccati matrix Π satisfies an algebraic Riccati equation given by
and the steady state offset vector s 0 satisfies the differential equation
Major Minor LQG Mean Field Game Systems
In this section, the convex analysis method introduced in Section 4 is utilized to rederive the best response strategies for major minor LQG MFG problems addressed in [9] . A large population N of minor agents with a major agent, where agents are subject to stochastic linear dynamics and quadratic cost functionals are considered. Each agent is coupled with other agents through their dynamics and cost functional with the average state of minor agents, i.e. the empirical mean field.
Dynamics
The dynamics of the major and minor agents are assumed to be given, respectively, by
where t ≥ 0, i ∈ N, N = {1, . . . , N}, N < ∞, and the subscript k, k ∈ K, K = {1, . . . , K}, K ≤ N, denotes the type of a minor agent. Here
. . , N}, are the states, u i t ∈ R m , i ∈ N 0 are the control inputs, {w i t , i ∈ N 0 } denotes (N + 1) independent standard Wiener processes in R r , where w i is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration F w := (F w t ) t∈[0,T ] . All matrices in (45) and (46) are constant and of appropriate dimension; vectors b 0 (t), and b k (t) are deterministic functions of time.
Agents types
Minor agents are given in K distinct types with 1 ≤ K < ∞. The notation
with Θ being the parameter set, and Ψ may be any dynamical parameter in (46) or wight matrix in the cost functional (49). The symbol I k denotes
where the cardinality of I k is denoted by N k = |I k |. Then, π N = (π N 1 , ..., π N K ), π N k = N k N , k ∈ K, denotes the empirical distribution of the parameters (θ 1 , ..., θ N ) sampled independently of the initial conditions and Wiener processes of the agents A i , i ∈ N. The first assumption is as follows.
Assumption 4. There exists π such that lim N →∞ π N = π a.s.
Control σ-Fields
We denote by F i := (F i t ) t∈[0,T ] , i ∈ N, the natural filtration generated by the i-th minor agent's state (x i t ) t∈[0,T ] , by F 0 := (F 0 t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by the major agent's state (x 0 t ) t∈[0,T ] , and F g := (F g t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by the states of all agents ((x i t ) i∈N , x 0 t ) t∈[0,T ] . Next, we introduce two admissible control sets. Let U 0 denote the set of feedback control laws with second moment lying in L 1 [0, T ], for any finite T , which are adapted to the local information set of the major agent A 0 , i.e. F 0 . The set of control inputs U i , i ∈ N, based upon the local information set of the minor agent A i , i ∈ N, consists of the feedback control laws adapted to the filtration
, and the L 1 [0, T ] constraint on second moments applies in each case.
Cost functionals
The individual (finite) large population finite horizon cost functional for the major agent is specified by
Assumption 5. For the cost functional (47) to be convex, we assume that G 0 ≥ 0,
The individual (finite) large population finite horizon cost functional for a minor agent A i , i ∈ N, is specified as
Assumption 6. For the cost functional (49) to be convex, we assume that G k ≥ 0,
We note that the major agent A 0 and minor agents A i , i ∈ N are coupled with each other through the average term x 
Solutions to Major Minor LQG MFG Problems
Following the mean field game methodology with a major agent [11] , [9] , the problem is first solved in the infinite population case where the average terms in the finite population dynamics and cost functional of each agent are replaced with their infinite population limit, i.e. the mean field. Then specializing to LQG MFG systems, the major agent's state is extended with the mean field, while the minor agent's state is extended with the major agent's state, and mean field; this yields stochastic optimal control problems for each agent linked only through the major agent's state and mean field. Finally the infinite population best response strategies are applied to the finite population system which yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium [9] . The following theorem specifies the control laws which yield the infinite population Nash equilibrium and their relation with the finite population ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (ǫ-Nash Equilibrium for LQG MFG Systems). [9] Assume that the conditions of [9] for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium hold, then the system equations (45)-(49) together with the mean field equations (76)-(77) generate a set of control laws U ∞
such that (i) the set of infinite population control laws U ∞ M F {u i, * ; i ≥ 0} yields the infinite population Nash equilibrium.
(ii) All agent systems A i , i ∈ N 0 , are second order stable.
(iii) the set of control laws U N M F {u i, * ; i ∈ N 0 }, 1 ≤ N < ∞, yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for all ǫ, i.e. for all ǫ > 0, there exists N(ǫ) such that for all N ≥ N(ǫ);
The proof of Theorem 5 consists of two parts: (i) the set of control laws U ∞ M F yields the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population system, (ii) when a finite subset of the control laws U N M F is applied to the finite population system, all agent systems are second order stable and it yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. In this section, a novel convex analysis approach is presented to retrieve the set of best response strategies U ∞ M F which yields the Nash equilibrium.
Mean Field Evolution
We introduce the empirical state average as
where the pointwise in time L 2 limit of x (N ) , if it exists, is called the mean field of the system and is denoted bȳ x = [x 1 , ...,x K ] . We consider for each minor agent A i of type k, k ∈ K, a uniform (with respect to i) feedback control u k i ∈ U i,L ⊂ U i , where U i,L consists of linear time invariant controls, as
where 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, L k 1 , L k,l 2 and L k 3 are constant matrices, and m k t is a continuous bounded function of time. If we substitute u i,k t in (46) for i ∈ N, and take the average of the states of closed loop systems of type k, k ∈ K, and hence calculate x (N ) t , it can be shown that the L 2 limitx t of x (N ) t , i.e. the mean field satisfies
whereĀ,Ḡ, andm are to be solved for in the tracking solution. By abuse of language, the mean value of the system's Gaussian mean field given by the state processx t = [x 1 t , ...,x K t ] shall also be termed the system's mean field.
Major Agent: Infinite Population
To solve the infinite population tracking problem for the major agent A 0 , first, its state is extended with the mean field processx t , where this is assumed to exist. Then the dynamics of major agent's extended state X 0 t (x 0 t ) T , (x t ) T T is given as (see [9] )
where
The infinite population individual cost functional for the major agent is given by
where the corresponding weight matrices are specified by
The dynamics (54) together with the cost functional (56) constitute a stochastic LQ optimal control problem for the major agent A 0 's extended system in the infinite population limit. To determine the optimal control u 0, * t , first Theorem 2 (with ρ = 0 ) is utilized to compute the Gâteaux derivative J ∞ ′ 0 (u 0 ) of (56) in the direction of ω 0 t ∈ U 0 as in
Then, as per Theorem 3, the optimal control action for the major agent's extended system (54)-(57) in the infinite population limit is given by
Finally, using Theorem 4, (60) can be written in the state feedback form as
(63)
Minor Agent: Infinite Population
To solve the infinite population tracking problem for a minor agent A i , i ∈ N, first, its state is extended with the major agent's state and the mean field processx t , where this is assumed to exist. Then the dynamics of minor agent A i 's extended
The infinite population individual cost functional for minor agent A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, is given by
The dynamics (64) together with the cost functional (66) constitute a stochastic LQ optimal control problem for the minor agent A i 's extended system in the infinite population limit. To determine the optimal control u i, * t for minor agent A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, first, using Theorem 2, the Gâteaux derivative J ∞ ′ i (u i ) of (66) is computed as
Then according to Theorem 3, the optimal control action for minor agent A i , i ∈ N, is given by
Finally, using Theorem 4, the control action (70) can be presented in linear state feedback form as
(73)
Mean Field Consistency Conditions
To obtain the consistency conditions, we substitute (71) into (46) which results in and e k = [0 n×n , ..., 0 n×n , I n , 0 n×n , ..., 0 n×n ], where the n × n identity matrix I n is at the kth block. If we take the average of (74) over subpopulation A k , k ∈ K, and then take the L 2 limit as the number N k of agents within the subpopulation goes to infinity ( i.e. N k → ∞), we get
If we equate (75) with (53), then by consistency requirement a compact description of the major minor mean field equations determiningĀ,Ḡ,m is given by
Remark 4 (Infinite Horizon LQG MFG Systems). For Infinite horizon LQG MFG systems where the terminal time is set to infinity, the terminal cost becomes zero. Hence, the major agent's infinite horizon cost functionals is given by
Similarly, the discounted infinite horizon cost functional for minor agent A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N is given by
The dynamics (45)-(46) for the major agent and minor agents remain the same in the infinite horizon LQG MFG systems. Given that Assumptions 7-8 hold, for the major agent's system (45), (78), the best response strategy is given by (61), where the steady state Riccati matrix Π 0 satisfies an algebraic Riccati equation given by
Similarly, for minor agent A i 's system (46), (79), i ∈ N, the best response strategy is given by (71), where the steady state Riccati matrix Π k and offset matrix s k satisfy the following algebraic Riccati equation and differential offset equation.
